We derive two hardness results on stable winning coalitions in Gamson's game. First, it is coNP-complete to decide whether there exists a stable winning coalition that is connected. Secondly, it is 2 P-complete to decide whether there exists a stable winning coalition that includes a weakest player. Our results precisely pinpoint the computational complexity of both problems, and they indicate a negative answer to a recent question of Le Breton et al. (2008, Soc Choice Welf 30:57-67).
1 Introduction Gamson (1961a,b) introduced a coalition formation game where certain resources are to be divided among a set of players who organize themselves in coalitions. In the end every player in the winning coalition receives a share of the resources that is proportional to his own contribution, while each of the remaining players (in any of the non-winning coalitions) receives nothing. This game is nowadays known under the name Gamson's game or Gamson's law, and it has generated a tremendous amount of work in various subareas of the social sciences.
Le Breton et al. (2008) place the game-theoretical interpretation of Gamson's game into the context of hedonic games as developed by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) . In this framework, the payoff of every player depends only on the composition of the coalition he belongs to. Among other results, Le Breton et al. (2008) establish the existence of equilibria in Gamson's game and provide combinatorial characterizations for them. As open problems, they ask for a characterization of the game situations for which stable coalitions exhibit connectedness or include the weakest player (see Sect. 2 for precise definitions of these concepts). We note that the used notion of stability is usually referred to as the core in coalition formation.
In this paper, we provide certain negative results on the two open problems of Le Breton et al. (2008) Both problems are proved to be computationally intractable: the first one is coNP-complete, and the second one is 2 P-complete. This makes it extremely unlikely that there is a clean and simple combinatorial characterization for these game situations, since this would imply the collapse of several complexity classes in computational complexity theory.
Organization of the paper. Section 2 precisely defines Gamson's game and summarizes all relevant definitions. Section 3 establishes coNP-completeness of deciding the existence of a stable coalition that is connected. Section 4 proves 2 P-completeness of deciding the existence of a stable coalition that includes a weakest player. We provide all relevant definitions from computational complexity in the first paragraphs of Sects. 3 and 4; for more information on these concepts we refer the reader for instance to the book of Papadimitriou (1994) .
Central definitions and considered questions
In Gamson's game, there is a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players. Each player i ∈ N is described by a positive real parameter θ i , interpreted as his endowment. For a subset S ⊆ N of players, we denote θ(S) = i∈S θ i . Without loss of generality, we assume that the players are ordered by endowment so that θ 1 ≥ θ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ n−1 ≥ θ n .
(1) A coalition S ⊆ N is connected, if for any three distinct players i, j, k ∈ N with i < j < k, we have that {i, k} ⊆ S implies j ∈ S; see Greenberg and Weber (1986) . We stress that connectedness is defined with respect to the ordering (1) of the players. A coalition S ⊆ N is winning, if the total endowment of S exceeds the total endowment of its complement N \ S, that is, if θ(S) > θ(N )/2. If a winning coalition S forms, every player i ∈ S receives a proportional payoff of θ i /θ (S). A non-winning coalition has nothing to offer to its members, and hence the corresponding payoffs for its players are 0. A winning coalition S is called stable, if there is no coalition T such that under the partition (T, N \ T ) every player in T receives a strictly larger payoff than under the partition (S, N \ S). Le Breton et al. (2008) observe that a winning coalition S is stable, if and only if it is weakest (in terms of endowment) among all the winning coalitions:
Fact 2.1 (Le Breton et al. 2008) A winning coalition S is stable, if and only if it minimizes the value θ(S) subject to the constraint θ(S) > θ(N )/2. Le Breton et al. (2008) state a number of results for stable winning coalitions if the number n of players in Gamson's game is small. For instance, for n = 4 players with endowments θ(N )/2 > θ 1 > θ 2 > θ 3 > θ 4 stable coalition must contain the weakest player (that is, the player with the smallest endowment θ 4 ) or otherwise must be connected. In strong contrast to this there exist examples with n = 5 players, in which the unique stable coalition neither is connected nor does contain a weakest player.
On page 61 of their article, Le Breton et al. (2008) write: "We leave open the interesting problem of the characterization of vectors θ ≡ (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n ) for which stable coalitions exhibit connectedness or include a weakest player." We will show that the existence of a nice characterization of such vectors is extremely unlikely: it is as unlikely as the existence of a nice characterization of certain very hard problems from computational complexity theory, so that a clean and simple characterization would imply the collapse of certain complexity classes. Hence, our results indicate that stable coalitions in Gamson's game form a combinatorially complicated and fairly messy concept.
Stable coalitions and connectedness
The complexity class coNP contains all decision problems whose NO-instances possess a short certificate (of polynomial length) that can be verified quickly (in polynomial time). We stress that the definition of coNP only requires the pure existence of such a certificate, but does not demand a fast algorithm for finding the certificate. Note that this definition is symmetric to the definition of class NP, which imposes such short certificates for the YES-instances of a decision problem. Actually, a decision problem lies in coNP if and only if its negation (in which the YES and NO answers are switched) lies in NP; hence both classes are kind of mirror images of each other.
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of the following decision problem.
Problem: GAMSON-CONNECTED Instance: Positive integers θ 1 ≥ θ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ n that form the endowments of the players in Gamson's game. Question: Does there exist a stable winning coalition that is connected?
We will show that problem GAMSON-CONNECTED is coNP-complete. This means that this problem (i) is contained in the class coNP, and (ii) belongs to the hardest problems in coNP. In other words, GAMSON-CONNECTED encapsulates and represents the full difficulty of the complexity class coNP.
Lemma 3.1 GAMSON-CONNECTED is contained in coNP.
Proof The certificate for a NO-instance is a non-connected winning coalition S that has strictly smaller endowment than the best connected winning coalition. The encoding length of this certificate is polynomially bounded in the input size, as it just specifies a subset S of the player set N . The quick verification of the certificate S is done as 123 follows. We enumerate all O(n 2 ) connected coalitions, and we determine the connected winning coalition T with the smallest endowment. Finally we verify that the endowments of S and T satisfy θ(S) < θ(T ).
Our next goal is to show that GAMSON-CONNECTED belongs to the hardest problems in coNP. This will be done by means of a polynomial time reduction from the NP-complete PARTITION problem; see Garey and Johnson (1979) .
We consider an arbitrary instance of PARTITION, and we construct an instance of Gamson's game with n = t + 3 players from it. There are t ordinary players with endowments 2a 1 , . . . , 2a t , two big players with endowment 2 A + 2, and one small player with endowment 1. Note that the small player has an odd endowment, whereas all other endowments are even. Note furthermore that θ(N ) = 8A + 5, so that any winning coalition must have an endowment of at least 4 A + 3.
Lemma 3.2 If there exists a coalition S with endowment θ(S) = 4 A + 3, then the PARTITION instance has answer YES and the GAMSON-CONNECTED instance has answer NO.
Proof As the small player is the only player with an odd endowment, this small player must be contained in S. As the total endowment of all the non-big players only amounts to 4 A+1, one of the big players must be in S. Then the total endowment of the remaining (ordinary) players in S is θ(S) − 1 − (2 A + 2) = 2 A. As the corresponding integers a i in the PARTITION instance add up to A, we see that the PARTITION instance indeed has answer YES.
Next suppose for the sake of contradiction that some coalition S with θ(S) = 4 A+3 was connected. As S contains the small player (with the minimum endowment 1) and one of the big players (with the maximum endowment 2 A + 2), it then would also have to contain all the intermediate ordinary players (with endowments between 2 and 2 A). This would yield the contradiction θ(S)
Consequently no connected winning coalition can have endowment 4 A + 3, and the GAMSON-CONNECTED instance has answer NO. Proof The coalition S * that solely consists of the two big players has endowment θ(S * ) = 4 A + 4. Clearly, S * is winning and connected. By the assumption of the lemma, there is no other winning coalition with smaller endowment. Hence S * is stable, and the GAMSON-CONNECTED instance has answer YES. Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , t} for the PARTITION instance with i∈I a i = A. Then the ordinary players corresponding to items in I , the small player, and one of the big players together would form a coalition with endowment 4 A + 3. This contradiction shows that the PARTITION instance indeed has answer NO.
All in all, the constructed instance of GAMSON-CONNECTED has answer NO if and only the PARTITION instance has answer YES. Hence the NP-hardness of PARTITION implies the coNP-hardness of GAMSON-CONNECTED. The following theorem summarizes all results derived in this section.
Theorem 3.4 GAMSON-CONNECTED is coNP-complete.
A closer look at the above construction reveals that the weakest player is in a stable winning coalition if and only if the PARTITION instance has answer YES. This implies the NP-hardness of the corresponding decision problem GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER. In the following section, we will derive a much stronger negative result on this problem.
Stable coalitions and the weakest player
The complexity class 2 P contains all decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time while using an oracle for NP. The NP-oracle serves as a black box: if we feed it with an arbitrary instance of an arbitrary decision problem in NP, then the oracle instantaneously returns the correct YES or NO answer for this instance. It is known that the class 2 P contains the entire Boolean hierarchy over NP, that is, the smallest complexity class that contains NP and that is closed under union, intersection, and complement. Intuitively speaking (and assuming P = NP), this class 2 P is much larger than NP and it contains problems that are much more difficult than all the problems in NP and coNP together.
A milestone result in this area by Papadimitriou (1984) shows that deciding whether an instance of the so-called Travelling Salesman problem has a unique optimal solution is 2 P-complete; in other words, the uniqueness question for the travelling salesman problem belongs to the hardest problems in 2 P and thus captures the full difficulty of the class 2 P. Krentel (1988) consider questions on the structure of optimal solutions of certain optimization problems, and identifies a number of 2 P-complete problems. Intuitively, a 2 P-complete problem is substantially more difficult than any NP-complete problem: an NP-complete problem can be solved with a single call to the NP-oracle, whereas a 2 P-complete problem belongs to the hardest problems that can be solved by using a polynomial number of calls to the NP-oracle. If a single 2 Pcomplete problem would be contained in NP, then the polynomial hierarchy would collapse and the classes P and NP would coincide; as a by-product this would answer the famous P = NP question in the positive sense.
In this section, we will discuss the computational complexity of the following decision problem. Question: Does there exist a stable winning coalition that contains a player with endowment θ n ?
We will show that problem GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER is 2 P-complete. In other words, GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER represents the full difficulty of the complexity class 2 P, and there is little hope that it could be as easy as an NP-complete problem.
Lemma 4.1 GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER is contained in 2 P.
Proof We describe an algorithm for GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER that proceeds in two phases. In the first phase, we determine the smallest integer U * > θ(N )/2 for which there exists a coalition S with θ(S) = U * . This is done by bisection search over the integers U in the range from θ(N )/2 + 1 to θ(N ). Every step of the bisection search asks the NP-oracle "Does there exist a coalition S with θ(N )/2 < θ(S) ≤ U ?", and then halves the search interval appropriately. YES-instances of this question have the coalition S as NP-certificate. After at most log(θ (N )/2) steps the search will terminate with the smallest such integer U * . Note that the number log(θ (N )/2) is polynomially bounded in the instance size, as this is roughly the number of bits needed to specify the endowments of all players.
In the second phase, we ask the NP-oracle the following question: "Does there exists a coalition T ⊆ N − {n} that satisfies θ(T ) = U * − θ n ?" If the answer is YES, then T ∪ {n} is a stable winning coalition that contains a weakest player. If the answer is NO, then no stable winning coalition does include a weakest player.
In the rest of this section, we will show that GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER is one of the hardest problems in 2 P. This will be done by a polynomial time reduction from the 2 P-complete problem EVEN-MIN-SAT; see Buss and Hay (1988) .
Problem: EVEN-MIN-SAT Instance: A set X = {x 1 , . . . , x s } of Boolean variables; a satisfiable Boolean formula ϕ over X in conjunctive normal form where each of the t clauses c 1 , . . . , c t consists of exactly three (distinct) literals. Question: Is x s = 0 in the lexicographically minimum satisfying truth assignment of ϕ?
Throughout we identify the truth value TRUE with 1, and the truth value FALSE with 0. Then every truth assignment of the variables corresponds to a bit string, and we consider the satisfying assignment (x * 1 , . . . , x * s ) that is lexicographically minimum; the answer to EVEN-MIN-SAT is YES if and only if the lowest position in this truth setting has x * s = 0. We consider an arbitrary instance of EVEN-MIN-SAT with s variables and t clauses, and we construct an instance of Gamson's game with n = 2s + 3t + 2 players from it. In our construction, the endowment of every player is specified in terms of its decimal representation, which consists of 2s + 2t digits that are partitioned into four pieces; see Fig. 1 for an illustration.
• The clause piece consists of the t left-most digits in the decimal representation, and the variable piece consists of the s digits immediately to the right of the clause Fig. 1 The partition of the decimal representations into four pieces piece. The next t digits form the verification piece, and the final s digits in the lowest positions form the lexicographic piece. • In the variable piece and in the lexicographic piece, the ith digit from the left (1 ≤ i ≤ s) corresponds to the Boolean variable x i . In the clause piece and in the verification piece, the jth digit from the left (1 ≤ j ≤ t) corresponds to clause c j .
Next, let us describe the n = 2s + 3t + 2 players in the GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER instance together with the decimal representation of their endowments.
• For every literal ∈ {x i , x i } with 1 ≤ i ≤ s there is a corresponding variable player X ( ). The endowment of player X ( ) has a 1-digit in the position corresponding to variable x i in the variable piece. If = x i is un-negated, then there is a 1-digit in the position that corresponds to x i in the lexicographic piece (whereas in case = x i is negated, this digit is 0). Furthermore, whenever literal occurs in clause c j , then the endowment has a 1-digit in the position corresponding to clause c j in the verification piece. All other digits are 0.
• For every clause c j there are three corresponding clause players C k (c j ) with k = 0, 1, 2. The endowment of player C k (c j ) has a 1-digit in the position corresponding to clause c j in the clause piece, and a k-digit in the position corresponding to clause c j in the verification piece. All other digits are 0. • Finally there are two dummy players D 1 and D 2 . The endowment of D 1 has a 3-digit in all positions of the clause piece, a 2-digit in the lowest (rightmost) position of the lexicographic piece, and a 1-digit in all remaining positions of the lexicographic piece. The endowment of D 2 has a 2-digit in all positions of the clause piece. All other digits are 0.
Note that the weakest player in this instance of Gamson's game is the variable player X (x s ) that corresponds to the negation of the last Boolean variable x s . Note furthermore that if we add up the decimal representations of the endowments of any subset of players, then there will be no carry-overs from lower positions to higher positions in the decimal representation.
For technical reasons, we also introduce two integers α and β. The decimal representation of α has a 4-digit in every position of the clause piece, a 3-digit in every position of the verification piece, and a 1-digit in every position of the variable piece and the lexicographic piece. The decimal representation of β has 1-digits throughout the lexicographic piece. The total endowment of all 2s + 3t + 2 players then amounts to θ(N ) = 2α + 1, and a coalition is winning if and only if its endowment is at least α + 1. The decimal representations of all the introduced numbers are summarized in Fig. 2. Next, consider an arbitrary truth assignment T of the variables in X that satisfies all clauses in the Boolean formula ϕ. We associate with T the following coalition P(T ) Proof The total endowment of P(T ) has a 4-digit in every position j of the clause piece (a 1 from the clause player for c j plus a 3 from dummy player D 1 ), a 1-digit in every position of the variable piece (from the corresponding variable player), a 3-digit in every position of the verification piece (k from the variable players, and 3 − k from the corresponding clause player), and finally digits 1 or 2 in the lexicographic piece (and perhaps a digit 3 in the lowest position).
Lemma 4.3
If the endowment of a coalition S lies between α + 1 and α + β + 1, then coalition S coincides with P(T ) for some satisfying truth assignment T .
Proof As the decimal representations of α + 1 and α + β + 1 agree in the clause piece, the variable piece, and the verification piece, the inequalities α + 1 ≤ θ(S) ≤ α + β + 1 enforce that also the decimal representation of θ(S) agrees with them in these pieces. Furthermore, the lexicographic piece of θ(S) must be at least as large as the lexicographic piece β + 1 of the lower bound α + 1.
Let us next discuss the players in coalition S. Player D 1 must be a member of S, as the lexicographic pieces of all other players together only add up to β. As the total endowment of both dummy players D 1 and D 2 exceeds the bound α + β + 1 by far, player D 2 cannot be a member of S. Hence coalition S consists of dummy player D 1 , a number of variable players, and a number of clause players. Since the clause piece of θ(S) agrees with the clause piece of α + 1, for j = 1, . . . , t exactly one of the three clause players C 0 (c j ), C 1 (c j ), C 2 (c j ) is in coalition S. Since the variable part of θ(S) agrees with the variable part of α + 1, for i = 1, . . . , s exactly one of the two variable players X (x i ) and X (x s ) is in coalition S.
Let T be the truth setting that makes a literal TRUE if and only if the corresponding variable player X ( ) is in S. Consider a clause c j in ϕ. The position corresponding to c j in the verification piece of θ(S) must carry a 3-digit. The clause players C 0 (c j ), C 1 (c j ), C 2 (c j ) contribute 0 or 1 or 2 to this position, as coalition S contains only one of them. Hence one of the variable players must contribute 1 to this position, and clause c j is satisfied under T . This yields the desired S = P(T ). Now let us return to problem GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER. As formula ϕ is satisfiable, Lemma 4.2 shows that a stable winning coalition must have its endowment between α+1 and α+β +1. Lemma 4.3 establishes a bijection between satisfying truth assignments T for formula ϕ and winning coalitions P(T ) with endowment at most α + β + 1. As the endowments of the various winning coalitions P(T ) differ only in their lexicographic pieces, a stable winning coalition P(T * ) will minimize the value of the lexicographic piece. This means that the corresponding truth assignment T * is lexicographically minimum among all satisfying truth assignments. Consequently, the weakest player X (x s ) is in the stable winning coalition P(T * ) if and only if the lexicographically minimum satisfying truth assignment T * has x * s = 0. In other words, problem GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER is difficult enough to emulate the Theorem 4.4 GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER is 2 P-complete.
We conclude our paper by discussing GAMSON-STRONGEST-PLAYER, the problem of deciding whether an instance of Gamson's game has a stable winning coalition that includes the strongest player.
Corollary 4.5 GAMSON-STRONGEST-PLAYER is 2 P-complete.
Proof (Sketch) The containment of GAMSON-STRONGEST-PLAYER in class 2 P is shown analogously to Lemma 4.1. 2 P-hardness of GAMSON-STRONGEST-PLAYER follows by a polynomial time reduction from GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER. Take an instance of GAMSON-WEAKEST-PLAYER with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and endowments θ 1 ≥ θ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ θ n . Construct a new instance by replacing the weakest player n by two new players with endowments 2θ(N ) and 2θ(N ) + θ n , respectively. It can be seen that the old game has a stable winning coalition that includes its weakest player if and only if the new game has a stable winning coalition that includes its strongest player. We leave all details to the reader.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that we should abandon all hope of designing an efficient algorithm to determine whether a particular instance of Gamson's game allows stable coalitions that are connected or include a weakest player. What remains to be done, however, is to identify (i) simple and nice sufficient conditions for the existence of such stable coalitions, and (ii) simple and nice necessary conditions for the existence of such stable coalitions. Of course, the goal would be to make the necessary conditions very close to the sufficient conditions.
